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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article argues that Confucian jurisprudence can accurately be 
analogized to Dworkin’s adjudicative theory of law, in particular, his 
interpretive theory of law.  To more effectively reveal the methods of 
Confucian jurisprudence and therefore carry out a comparison with 
Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law, this article adopts Dworkin’s 
methodology of focusing on “hard cases.”  Specifically, this article 
identifies and then examines an actual hard case (from Tang dynasty China) 
which is arguably representative of Confucian jurisprudence in action – the 
controversial case of Xu Yuanqing, who committed a revenge killing against 
a low-ranking official who had killed his father.  In particular, this article 
translates into English and analyzes two diverging legal opinions authored 
by Confucian officials on the case (one calling for Xu’s execution, the other 
calling for Xu to be spared), attempting to show the similarities between 
Confucian jurisprudence and Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law.  This 
article concludes by discussing the implications of such similarities on legal 
theory more generally.  To that end, it will argue that Dworkin’s 
adjudicative theory of law need not necessarily be confined to Anglo-
American jurisprudence, and that, despite Dworkin’s own assertions to the 
contrary, Confucian jurisprudence is in fact not incompatible with 
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Dworkinian approaches to law.  Finally, this article will also highlight some 
unique, different features of Confucian jurisprudence and how such features 
might contribute to comparative jurisprudence more generally.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 China law scholar Randall Peerenboom has challenged existing, 
standard scholarly accounts of Confucianism as natural law1 and has argued 
that Confucian jurisprudence shares more in common with Ronald 
Dworkin’s interpretive theory of the law as integrity than natural law 
doctrines.2  In his book Law and Morality in Ancient China: The Silk 
Manuscripts of Huang-Lao, Peerenboom wrote that Confucian legal theory 
is “much closer to a Dworkinian coherence account of the law as 
constructive interpretation.”3 Peerenboom asserts the Confucian sage-
judge’s goal in deciding a case is to “striv[e] for an equilibrium among the 
conflicting interests that will reflect the highest possible degree of social 
harmony attainable given the particular constraints” of the case, to “render 
the law consistent with a specific society’s values, practices, goals and 
needs” and, following Dworkinian language, to “make both the law and the 
 
 
1 See DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967); JOSEPH NEEDHAM, 
SCIENCE & CIVILISATION IN CHINA: VOLUME 2 (1956) (both setting forth accounts of Confucianism as 
natural law).    
2 Randall P. Peerenboom, Confucian Jurisprudence: Beyond Natural Law, 18 ASIA CULTURAL 
Q. 12, 12 (1990); see also Geoffrey MacCormack, Natural Law in Traditional China (2013-2014) 8 J. 
COMP. L. 104, 121 (2013-14).  
3 See S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 69 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006) (discussing coherence 
accounts and Dworkin’s visions of legal reasoning).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/5
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world we live in the best it can be.”4  However, in the same book, 
Peerenboom himself explicitly notes that despite the great interest Eastern 
and Western legal theorists might have in a comparison of Dworkin and 
Confucian jurisprudence, his book would not engage in a sustained, 
“sophisticated” comparison between Dworkin and Confucius and therefore 
such a discussion must “await another forum.”5   
 As its most immediate goal, this article seeks to be such a forum and 
to develop Peerenboom’s thesis that Confucian jurisprudence can accurately 
be analogized to a Dworkinian interpretive theory of law. Indeed, to my 
knowledge, no scholarly work to date—in English or Chinese—has really 
engaged in such an enterprise.6  To accomplish this immediate goal, I adopt 
Dworkin’s methodology of focusing on hard cases, which, as Raymond 
Wacks has noted, allow us to focus “our attention on the judicial role in its 
most graphic and most important form.”7 In other words, a judge’s approach 
to hard cases allows us to best understand a judge’s theory,  method of 
adjudication, and what is most novel about his or her adjudicative approach.  
I also adopt Dworkin’s definition of a “hard case,” which he defines as a 
case where “no settled rule dictates a decision either way . . . .”8  In other 
words, hard cases are cases where no clear rule of law was immediately 
applicable, and hence judges will have to use other standards to decide cases 
than rules.9  They are also cases which deal with fundamental propositions 
of law, upon which lawyers may disagree.10  They have also been described 
as cases where arguments exist as to what is the best understanding of law, 
in contrast to clear cases, where no such doubt exists.11   
The importance of such hard cases to Dworkin’s views on law cannot 
be overstated. William Twining argues that Dworkin’s central question was, 
in fact, “what constitutes a valid and cogent argument on a question of law 
in a hard case.”12 Therefore, I have identified, from the Chinese historical 
record, an actual, real-world case which I believe can be accurately termed 
 
 
4 RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, LAW AND MORALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA: THE SILK MANUSCRIPTS 
OF HUANG-LAO 119 (1993). 
5 Id. at 25. 
6 Linghao Wang & Lawrence Solum, Confucian Virtue Jurisprudence, in LAW, VIRTUE, AND 
JUSTICE 105, 128 (Amalia Amaya & Hock Lai Ho eds., 2012) (claiming it will address the argument 
that Confucian theory of law is considered a Dworkinian coherentist theory, but ultimately does not do 
so). 
7 RAYMOND WACKS, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE 142 (4th ed. 2015). 
8 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 83 (1978). 
9 Id. at 81, 116-17; see also WACKS, supra note 7, at 140. 
10 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at xiv; WACKS, supra note 7, at 141. 
11 M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 720 (8th ed. 2008). 
12 WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 64 (2000).   
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a Dworkinian “hard case”, dating from the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.)—
namely the case of Xu Yuanqing, who had committed a revenge killing 
against a low-ranking official who had killed his father.  This article will 
translate into English, compare, and analyze two competing legal opinions 
written by two prominent Tang dynasty Confucian officials tasked with 
opining on this case who can generally be described as representing the 
Confucian tradition and whose opinions can be seen as examples of 
Confucian jurisprudence. It will argue that Confucian jurisprudence does in 
fact share many points in common with Dworkin’s interpretive approach to 
law, as well as other aspects of his broader views on the composition of law 
and legal systems. 
 As a broader and hopefully more far-reaching goal, this article also 
seeks to contribute to legal theory and comparative jurisprudence more 
generally in three ways.  First, through a comparison between Confucian 
jurisprudence and Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law, I hope to show that 
Dworkin’s theories of adjudication and the application of his views on law 
more generally need not be confined only to Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  Second, despite Dworkin’s own beliefs to the contrary, I 
hope to show that the traditional Confucian approach to jurisprudence (as 
seen through the Xu Yuanqing case) is not incompatible with Dworkin’s 
interpretive approach to law.  In that sense, one could therefore argue that 
many elements of Confucian jurisprudence are not uniquely Sinic, but have 
more universal, general characteristics.  Third, I also hope to highlight what 
is perhaps more unique about Confucian jurisprudence and how it might 
contribute to dialogue on comparative jurisprudence generally. 
 This article is comprised of three major sections.  First, I will provide 
a brief overview of Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law (at least, the 
aspects which are germane to this article and the comparison to be 
undertaken) and, in particular, his use of “hard cases” in his theory of 
adjudication in order to set the stage for comparison with Confucian 
jurisprudence as reflected by the Xu Yuanqing case.  Second, I will discuss 
the Xu Yuanqing case and analyze the two competing Tang legal opinions 
to highlight points of similarity with Dworkin’s interpretive theory and 
views on law.  Third, this article will conclude by discussing the three 
broader implications mentioned in the preceding paragraph of such 
comparison on legal theory generally. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DWORKIN’S INTERPRETIVE THEORY OF LAW 
Much has been written on Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law, from 
jurisprudence textbooks summarizing the salient aspects of Dworkin’s legal 
thought to monographs and book chapters responding to and critiquing 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/5
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specific elements of Dworkin’s visions of law.13  Furthermore, Dworkin’s 
views on law are complex, and they have developed over his academic 
career.  Therefore, this section aims to provide only a brief overview of what 
I think are the more salient aspects of Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law 
and, in particular, his use of “hard cases” in his adjudication theory. It is not 
intended to be a wide-ranging, comprehensive summary of Dworkin’s 
views on law.  Furthermore, given that much has been written on Dworkin’s 
legal theories, I rely substantially on existing scholarly summaries of 
Dworkin’s legal theories already present in the literature, as I find no need 
to reinvent the wheel.   
Let us begin with the building blocks of Dworkin’s legal universe.  
Dworkin’s main charge against legal positivism—and a theme seen in his 
early writings—is that law is not simply made up entirely of rules with 
discretion to judges when deciding cases not covered by an existing rule.14  
Rather, in addition to rules, law also consists of non-rule standards which 
Dworkin called principles.  For Dworkin, principles are moral standards 
implied by or explicitly stated in past official actions, such as legal statutes, 
previous case decisions, and constitutional provisions.15  In Dworkin’s 
view, a principle was a standard to be followed and adhered to, not because 
it would bring about some social, political, or economic benefit, but because 
“it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of 
morality.”16  Therefore, in Dworkin’s view, when judges were faced with 
deciding on a dispute not covered by an existing rule of law, they appealed 
to principles of “the great network of political structures and decisions of 
[their] community.”17  As an example of what constitutes a principle, 
Dworkin utilized the American case of Riggs v. Palmer.18  In that case, a 
murderer sought to inherit under his victim’s will, which had been validly 
executed and which was in his favor.  The court had to decide whether this 
was permitted; there was no clear guidance under New York rules of 
testamentary succession, which did not clearly prohibit the murderer from 
inheriting.  However, the court ultimately decided against the murderer, 
relying on the principle that “no man should profit from his own wrong.”  
Examples of principles in Confucian jurisprudence might be principles 
 
 
13 See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN (3d ed. 2012), Hershovitz, supra note 3, FREEMAN, 
supra note 11, RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE (Marshall Cohen ed. 1984).   
14 BRIAN BIX, Dworkin, Ronald, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (VOL. 1) 233 
(Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999).   
15 Id. at 233-34. 
16 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at 22. 
17 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 245 (1986).   
18 See 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).   
Washington University Open Scholarship
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which seek to uphold the parent-child relationship, given the importance of 
filial piety in Confucian morality—e.g., “a child should not knowingly 
cause physical or emotional harm to his parents” or perhaps a principle 
stated in the positive, such as “a child should properly honor and respect his 
parents.”  It should be noted here that Dworkin was careful to distinguish 
his notion of principles from “policies,” which themselves could 
theoretically serve as another form of justification for decisions.  Policies, 
for Dworkin, are different in the sense that they are standards that represent 
goals to be reached, “generally an improvement in some economic, 
political, or social feature of the community.”19  Examples of policies which 
can be commonly found in traditional Chinese Confucian political rhetoric 
are standards which seek to promote Confucian morality in society as a 
whole, or standards which seek to ensure social and political stability.  
Ideally, for Dworkin, decisions to cases must be driven by and decided upon 
principles, as decisions generated by policy are more the proper concern of 
the legislature than the courts.20  Yet, as Dworkin noted, even if a judge is 
advancing a policy argument to justify a decision, he is actually referring to 
principles because he is deciding the individual rights of members of the 
community (e.g., an argument to favor public safety by limiting an abstract 
right should be understood as an appeal to the competing rights of those 
whose security is to be sacrificed).21   
Having now discussed the broad strokes of Dworkin’s attack on 
positivism and the main components of his theories on law (namely, his 
belief that law is comprised not simply of rules but also of principles), we 
can now proceed to discuss Dworkin’s views on adjudication.  For Dworkin, 
in deciding cases, a judge could not choose principles regarding the law 
simply at whim.  Judges had to ask whether the principles relied upon could 
form “part of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole”22—and, 
for every legal problem, there was one right answer which would best 
cohere with the institutional and constitutional history of the law.23  In other 
words, according to Dworkin, judges reject principles (or other theories of 
law they are considering in the case before them) which do not adequately 
“fit” previous official actions;  with regard to principles that do adequately 
“fit” previous official actions, judges will choose those which best combine 
“fit” and moral value to make the law the best it can be.24  Dworkin’s 
 
 
19 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at 22. 
20 WACKS, supra note 7, at 141.  
21 Id. at 140.   
22 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 245. 
23 WACKS, supra note 7, at 137. 
24 BIX, supra note 14, at 234. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/5
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concept of “fit,” in other words, is concerned with how well a judge’s 
particular decisions “fit with what is accepted as settled law”25 and the legal 
history of the judge’s particular jurisdiction.26  Therefore, for Dworkin, law 
is best understood through, and as, constructive interpretation—
interpretation “that makes its object the best example of its genre that it can 
be.”27  He ultimately uses the principle of “integrity” to encapsulate his 
theory of adjudication; Dworkin’s concept of integrity stands for the notion 
that judges should decide cases in a way which makes the law more 
coherent, favoring interpretations which make law more “like the product 
of a single moral vision.”28  Just as a person who has integrity is faithful and 
consistent to his previous conduct and viewpoints, a judge with integrity 
should ensure his decisions line up with settled law (“fit”) as well as the 
substantive political morality (“substance”) of his jurisdiction.29 
Dworkin used a hypothetical judge named Hercules to further 
explicate his interpretive approach to law and to illustrate the principle of 
integrity in the adjudication of hard cases.  What happens, therefore, when 
Hercules is presented with a hard case?  First, some basic remarks about 
Hercules’s characteristics are in order.  Dworkin imagined Hercules as a 
judge in an American jurisdiction who accepts the “main, uncontroversial 
constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction.”30  
Furthermore, Dworkin assumed Hercules accepts certain important 
propositions about the operation of law: namely, that statutes have the 
power to create and extinguish legal rights and that judges have the general 
duty to follow earlier decisions of their own court or higher courts whose 
reasoning and rationale extend to the case at hand.31  Hercules himself is a 
judge “of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and acumen” and is expected 
to “construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a 
coherent justification for all common law precedents and---so far as these 
are to be justified on principle---constitutional and statutory principles as 
well.”32  Should more than one reconstruction be possible, Hercules must 
decide on the theory of law which best coheres with his community’s 
 
 
25 JAMES PENNER & EMMANUEL MELISSARIS, MCCOUBREY & WHITE’S TEXTBOOK ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 94 (5th ed., 2012); see also DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 228-58. 
26 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 255. 
27 BIX, supra note 14, at 234.  
28 Id. 
29 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 256-57; PENNER & MELISSARIS, supra note 25, at 
94. 
30 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at 105. 
31 Id. at 105-106. 
32 Id. at 105, 116-17. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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institutional history.33 
In deciding a hard case, Hercules must seek consistency and integrity 
in answering legal questions, and he should be “wide-ranging and 
imaginative in his search for coherence with fundamental principle.”34  
Viewing law as integrity would also mandate that Hercules ask himself 
whether his interpretation of law could form part of a coherent theory 
justifying the whole legal system in which he operates.35  To further 
illustrate his interpretive vision of law, Dworkin also analogized law to 
literature, comparing a judge to authors in a chain novel.36  Judges are like 
authors who are writing new chapters in a chain novel.  When authors do 
this, they must pay attention to the previous chapters and aim to write 
something that will ultimately make the finished chain novel readable and 
most importantly, coherent as a whole.  Likewise, when judges are deciding 
cases, they must also have knowledge and a vision of the story—they must 
have a vision of its “characters, plot, theme, genre, and general purpose, 
attempting to find the meaning in the evolving creation, and an 
interpretation that best justifies it.”37  Ultimately, akin to a critic who 
interprets a work of art to show it in its best possible light, a judge interprets 
his jurisdiction’s law to display it “as the most morally sound body of law 
it can be, given the actual legal history the judge finds.”38 
The key takeaway of the above summary is perhaps that Dworkin 
viewed law as an interpretive process, not simply a collection of posited 
rules.  Furthermore, as opposed to legal positivism, which focused more 
exclusively on rules, Dworkin believed that the resources on which judges 
could draw upon to decide cases according to law were much more diverse, 
and that the process of legal interpretation and reasoning on the judges’ part 
in deciding the particular case were more subtle, nuanced, and 
sophisticated.39  One final important aspect of Dworkin’s “interpretive” 
approach to law should be stressed here—Dworkin’s concept of integrity 
was very much grounded in political liberalism with its emphasis on 
equality and individual rights.40  In his discussion of legal adjudication and 
principles, Dworkin emphasized that principles related to rights (in contrast 
with policies, which usually served some broader community social, 
 
 
33 WACKS, supra note 7, at 140. 
34 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 220. 
35 WACKS, supra note 7, at 148-49. 
36 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 228-32. 
37 WACKS, supra note 7, at 147. 
38 James Penner, Law as Integrity: Dworkin’s Interpretive Turn, in JURISPRUDENCE & LEGAL 
THEORY: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 385 (James Penner et al. eds., 2005). 
39 BIX, supra note 14, at 233. 
40 See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 95-96. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/5
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political, or economic goal).  Judges should decide cases, if the case 
required, based on principles, not policies.  For Dworkin, rights had a 
trumping effect. In other words, in any particular case and if there were no 
exceptional considerations at play, legal arguments based upon rights 
should always defeat arguments based on other interests, namely policy or 
community goals.  Judges should “decide, according to principle, litigants’ 
entitlements, not what services community best.”41  This emphasis on rights 
is important, especially given that Dworkin was ultimately trying to define 
and defend a liberal theory of law.42  Ultimately, Dworkin’s legal theory is 
couched in a liberalism where government treats its citizens as equals and 
where government “must impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in 
virtue of an argument that the citizen could not accept without abandoning 
his sense of equal worth.”43  Thus, for Dworkin, individual rights and liberty 
are critically important and lynchpins of individual dignity, the protection 
of which he considered key in his philosophical positions.44 
This section has only sketched out the salient aspects of Dworkin’s 
interpretive theory of law and his portrayal of judges and hard cases in his 
theory of adjudication.  The next section presents a real case, a Dworkinian 
“hard case,” from the Chinese tradition which I believe allows us to see 
Confucian jurisprudence and legal adjudication in practice and hence will 
allow us to compare Dworkin and Confucian jurisprudence in a systematic 
way. 
II.A “HARD CASE” IN CONFUCIAN JURISPRUDENCE: THE XU YUANQING 
REVENGE KILLING IN THE SEVENTH CENTURY A.D. 
As discussed in the preceding section, “hard cases” for Dworkin were 
cases where no clear rule of law was immediately applicable, leading judges 
to resort to other standards to decide the cases.  They can also be understood 
as cases dealing with fundamental propositions of law, upon which lawyers 
may disagree, as well as cases where arguments exist as to what is the best 
understanding of law.  I believe the revenge killing case of Xu Yuanqing – 
which reached the court of Empress Wu Zetian in the mid-690s – is a good 
example of a Dworkinian “hard case” from traditional China for two major 
reasons. 
First, revenge killings were a type of crime not clearly covered by any 
 
 
41 FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 718. 
42 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at i. 
43 Quoted in WACKS, supra note 7, at 145. 
44 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011) (discussing individual dignity).   
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provision of the Tang Code, which did not contain any specific article on 
revenge in retaliation for murder.  Therefore, as we will see in the Xu 
Yuanqing legal opinions, officials45 tasked with ruling on revenge killings 
had to resort to other standards to decide such cases.  Such standards 
included examples of revenge killings in earlier periods of Chinese history 
or writings on revenge killings in Chinese classical texts, including the Book 
of Rites (Liji),46 the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli),47 and the Gongyang and 
Zuozhuan commentaries to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu).48  
Indeed, these early classical canonical texts advanced the principle that it is 
natural for a man to retaliate with violence if his parents are murdered.49  
One passage in the Book of Rites, for example, sets forth that “one should 
not live under the same Heaven with the enemy who has slain one’s 
father.”50  The Rites of Zhou sets forth the role of a conciliator, whose job 
included resolving revenge killing cases by, for example, expelling the 
murderer of a father “beyond the seas” and “in cases where a man has 
 
 
45 It is important to point out that there was no independent professional class of “lawyers” or 
“judges” in Tang dynasty China; rather, officials were tasked with judging cases, along with other 
responsibilities in their jurisdiction.  Therefore, I do not use the term “judge” to describe Tang officials 
tasked with deciding criminal cases.   
46 The BOOK OF RITES was, for much of Chinese history, thought to have been compiled by 
Confucius.  Today, most scholars agree that the text was most likely compiled and edited by Han dynasty 
scholars.  Regardless, the BOOK OF RITES is one of the Chinese Confucian Classics that describes the 
government system and rites of the Zhou Dynasty.   
47 The RITES OF ZHOU is often dated back to about the 3rd century BC.  It is an important primary 
source text that provides information on the political and administrative system of the Zhou dynasty.  
The text discusses various officials in Zhou government, thedetails of their responsibilities, and how 
they should perform their duties.   
48 The SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS is essentially a history of the twelve dukes of the ancient 
Chinese state of Lu from roughly 722 to 481 BC.  Its structure is akin to that of a historical outline or 
timeline, reporting facts in a chronological, pithy order.  Authorship was traditionally attributed to 
Confucius.  Because of the terse nature of the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS, some authors wrote 
commentaries to expound and explain certain events and personages in the SPRING AND AUTUMN 
ANNALS.  The ZUOZHUAN is one such commentary and is regarded as the earliest work of narrative 
history in China.  Its authorship has been traditionally attributed to Zuo Qiuming, a writer that lived in 
the fifth century BC in Lu.  It runs chronologically parallel with the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS and 
expounds on numerous events and is filled with rich accounts and stories.  Some scholars in China now 
believe the ZUOZHUAN should be understood not as a commentary to the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS, 
but rather as a free-standing work that was later inserted into the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS.  The 
ZUOZHUAN is thought to date to the late fourth-century BC; it is considered one of the most important 
primary sources for the period as it augments the basic information provided in the SPRING AND AUTUMN 
ANNALS.  The GONGYANG is another commentary on the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS.  Its authorship 
has traditionally been attributed to Gongyang Gao, who was a disciple of Zixia (himself a disciple of 
Confucius).    
49 Michael Dalby, Revenge and the Law in Traditional China, 25.4 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 267, 
270 (1981).  Dalby’s article is the most comprehensive treatment of the subject of revenge killings and 
traditional Chinese law in English.  Traditional Chinese perspectives on revenge are also discussed in 
James McMullen, Confucian Perspectives on the Akō Revenge: Law and Moral Agency, 58.3 
MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 293, 296-98 (2003).   
50 Dalby, supra note 49, at 271. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/5
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murdered someone but was justified in doing so”, the conciliator should 
order “that no reprisal shall be taken against him.”51  The Gongyang 
commentary advanced an even clearer standard: “when one’s father has not 
undergone [a proper or just] execution, the son may take revenge on his 
behalf.  But if the father has been [legitimately] executed, and the son then 
takes revenge [anyway], this is the way of the thrusting sword, which cannot 
remove the danger.”52  Besides the above textual and historical standards, 
officials judging revenge killing cases – such as the Xu Yuanqing case – 
also paid heed to other societal, cultural, and legal standards, such as the 
desire to maintain good precedents and to preserve societal order. 
Second, revenge killing cases in traditional China can generally be 
understood as “hard cases” because they often were not covered by a 
specific legal rule and also dealt with fundamental propositions of law upon 
which lawyers (or, in traditional China, officials)53 disagreed.  Indeed, they 
were cases which involved the most serious of crimes– premeditated 
homicide– and which dealt with the most fundamental issues and questions 
of law: questions of guilt (e.g., whether the avenger should be held culpable 
for avenging his father’s murder and punished under the Tang’s laws against 
murder) and punishment (e.g., whether the ultimate punishment, capital 
punishment, should be levied).  And, there were disagreements on these 
issues and questions. For example, some officials did not even seek to 
punish acts of vengeance as the act of revenge in retaliation for murder 
frequently elicited sympathy in traditional China, and such acts were often 
not prohibited or legally punished.54 For example, in the early Tang, it 
appears from the historical record that sentences applied to avengers were 
not set in stone but rather vacillated between two extremes – capital 
punishment or complete pardon.55  Other officials argued that revenge 
killings, despite their different circumstances and moral attractiveness in 
avenging an innocent victim’s death, should be punished under the regular 
murder laws (such as the Tang Code provisions which prescribed 
 
 
51 Id. at 271-72. 
52 Id. at 273. 
53 It is important to remember that “lawyers” – that is, the notion of an independent, licensed class 
of legal professionals – did not exist in traditional China.  Nor did “judges” in the Western sense exist – 
i.e., officials trained in law whose sole government function was to adjudicate cases.  In traditional 
China, officials who decided cases also often had other administrative responsibilities.  For example, 
cases were usually adjudicated first by a magistrate, who was responsible for all administrative 
responsibilities (hearing cases, implementing fiscal policies, overseeing lower-level administrators) in 
their jurisdiction. Hence, it is more accurate to refer to officials who adjudicated cases in traditional 
China simply as “officials” and not as “judges.”   
54 Dalby, supra note 49, at 267-68.   
55 Id. at 279. 
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decapitation for premeditated murders where the murderer’s intention was 
formed prior to the killing, since it is common for people avenging a 
murdered comrade to plan out his act of revenge).56   
More specifically, regarding the Xu Yuanqing revenge killing case, 
Xu’s fate – i.e., to offer him clemency from capital punishment or to execute 
him – was debated at court and led to the writing of two diverging legal 
opinions by two high-ranking officials in the Tang court, one of whom 
favored execution and one of whom favored clemency.  Therefore, I believe 
that the Xu Yuanqing case – and indeed revenge killing cases in traditional 
China more generally– can be properly understood as “hard cases” in the 
Dworkinian sense. 
Let us first begin with the factual background of the Xu Yuanqing case.  
A few years before the mid-690s, Xu’s father was put to death by a low-
ranking official named Zhao Shiyun in his home county near the capital city 
of Chang’an.  The precise circumstances of the case and of the murder of 
Xu’s father are not fully clear, but it appears that Zhao was abusing his 
official power in executing Xu’s father.57  Xu was angered by the death of 
his father and went into hiding.  He changed his name and supported himself 
as a laborer in a post station.  All of his actions were premeditated and 
focused on one goal – to lie in wait and avenge his father by killing Zhao 
Shiyun (who, incidentally, had become a more famous official).  Eventually, 
Xu successfully hunted Zhao Shiyun down and murdered him.  Xu then 
immediately turned himself into the authorities, and the case eventually 
reached the highest court of the Tang Dynasty.58  The general attitude there 
was that Xu Yuanqing should be spared from death, a position Empress Wu 
Zetian agreed with.  However, one high-ranking official, Chen Ziang (~661-
702 A.D.), disagreed, and put forth a legal opinion on the case urging that 
Xu Yuanqing be executed.  In the end, Empress Wu had Xu Yuanqing put 
to death, but also had him honored posthumously, largely following Chen 
Ziang’s legal opinion.59  In about 805, approximately a century after Chen 
Ziang’s legal opinion was published, Liu Zongyuan (773-819 A.D.), a 
prominent Tang poet and official, wrote a legal opinion attacking Chen 
 
 
56 GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 38 (1996). 
57 Dalby, supra note 49, at 279. 
58 Id. 
59 For Chen Ziang’s biography in the dynastic histories, see LIU XU, JIU TANG SHU [THE OLD 
BOOK OF THE TANG] 190.5018-5025 (Beijing Zhonghua Publishing 1962) (945). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/5
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Ziang’s opinion.60  We begin first with Chen Ziang’s legal opinion:61 
 
The Sage Kings established rites (li)62 in order to allow man to 
improve and advance, and they clarified punishments in order to 
facilitate government.  It is filial righteousness for a son to lie in 
wait with arms to prepare to take revenge against his enemy.  A 
guiding principle and central element of a government is to execute 
criminals in order to prohibit and prevent rebellions.  However, 
immorality and lack of righteousness cannot instruct and lead the 
people, and by putting the guiding principles of government into 
disorder, [the written] laws will not be able to be clarified.  The 
Sage Kings established rites to regulate internal (i.e., domestic and 
home) affairs, and they established laws to prevent external 
disorder.  Through these means, law-abiding people did not 
manipulate rites in order to abolish punishments.  Conversely, those 
who abided by the rules of the rites did not misuse laws to harm the 
meaning of the way.  As a result, [the sage kings were able to] put 
an end to violent disorder and nurture [hearts of] integrity and 
shame.  Therefore, from this, the whole world was able to proceed 
on the right Way and develop.63 
 
As we can see above, Chen began his opinion by creating a dichotomy 
between rites on one hand and laws and punishments on the other.  A quick 
note on terminology here is in order - by “law”, Chen (and later, Liu, in the 
 
 
60 Dalby, supra note 49, at 282.  Kam-por Yu, Confucian Views on Revenge (conference paper 
delivered at the First Global Conference on Revenge, organized by Interdisciplinary Net, Mansfield 
College, Oxford, June 15-17, 2010) 8, available at https://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/yuchapter.pdf; See also Li Jie, A Comparative Study of Revenge and Law in 
the Chinese and Western Cultures, 11.4 CAN. SOC. SCI. 180, 181 (2015).  For an overview of Liu 
Zongyuan’s life, see JO-SHUI CHEN, LIU TSUNG-YÜAN AND INTELLECTUAL CHANGE IN T’ANG CHINA, 
773-819 (1992). 
61 Dalby discusses this opinion, although he does not provide a full translation, in Dalby, supra 
note 49, at 279-282.  I am indebted to Dalby’s discussion, which helped in my understanding and 
translation of Chen Ziang’s legal opinion.  However, my interpretation of Chen Ziang’s legal opinion 
differs in some areas from Dalby’s.   
62 I also translate this is as “ritual” or “ritual propriety” in this article. 
63 OUYANG XIU & SONG QI, XIN TANGSHU [THE NEW STANDARD HISTORY OF THE TANG] 
195.5585-5586 (Taipei Dingwen Publishing 1981) (1060).  The text of Chen Ziang’s opinion is recorded 
in the XIN TANGSHU. Another version of Chen Ziang’s opinion can also be found in Chen Ziang, Fu 
chou yi [Memorial on the Revenge Debate], in CHEN ZIANG JI [THE COLLECTED WORKS OF CHEN 
ZIANG] 7.152-153 (Beijing Zhonghua Publishing ed., 1962).  My translation is mainly based on the XIN 
TANGSHU version, but I also include material from the CHEN ZIANG JI version not recorded in the XIN 
TANGSHU version, to ensure a complete translation.  All translations to English in this article are mine, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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second legal opinion) was referring to posited, written law (e.g., statutes and 
codes).  In Chen’s view, the Sage Kings – progenitors of Chinese 
civilization and model leaders – created rites to strengthen individual and 
societal morality.  Rites should be understood separately from punishments, 
which were established to “prevent external disorder” and strengthen and 
make government more effective.  However, both rites and the written laws 
and punishments are indispensable to the smooth running of society – 
written laws and punishments keep society and government orderly, while 
rites nurture the moral hearts of the people.   In other words, for Chen, laws 
and punishments were not the only standards in society – non-rule 
standards, such as rites, were also important.  Rites can perhaps therefore be 
analogized to Dworkin’s notion of “principles” or moral standards to be 
followed due to the requirements of justice, fairness, or another dimension 
of morality.  Chen also advanced a Dworkinian principle above – that it is 
a manifestation of filial righteousness for a son to lie in wait with weapons 
and essentially premeditate an act of vengeance for his parent(s).  Besides 
advancing standards which we might analogize to Dworkinian “principles,” 
Chen also advanced a standard which we can identify as a Dworkinian 
“policy” as well – that any government must execute criminals in order to 
“prevent rebellions.”  In other words, we can see that Chen made an appeal 
to public safety and order.  Therefore, even from this introductory paragraph 
in Chen’s legal opinion, we can see Chen’s similar belief to Dworkin that 
the sources of law in society are far more complex and nuanced than simply 
a system of rules or posited, written law.  Having set forth his understanding 
of rites and written laws & punishments as the key regulatory tools for 
individuals and government, Chen then continued with a specific discussion 
of the Xu case: 
 
I have now learned of the case of Xu Yuanqing.  His father was 
killed by a district official named Zhao Shiyun.  Yuanqing kept 
himself healthy and worked odd jobs [to support himself].  He then 
avenged his father’s murder and killed Shiyun with his own bare 
hands.  Afterwards, he turned himself in.  Even the ancient heroes 
cannot compete with him. His sincerity is sufficient to drive out evil 
and usher in the good, as well as to educate others [on morality] . . 
. .  But according to the law of our state, he who kills another shall 
himself be put to death.  This is a unified standard and rule; the law 
must therefore be consistent.  Xu Yuanqing therefore should be put 
to death.64   
 
 
64 Id. at 195.5586.  
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Here, early on in his legal opinion, Chen made clear his ultimate decision 
on the Xu Yuanqing’s punishment – that Xu should be put to death.  Despite 
the fact that there was no specific Tang law or statute – or in Dworkin’s 
terms, a “rule” – on revenge killings, Chen relied on the principle that a 
person “who kills another shall himself be put to death.”  This is quite 
similar to the approach of the court in the Riggs v. Palmer case (as discussed 
earlier) which Dworkin used to show that law includes principles, in 
addition to rules. Indeed, in Riggs v. Palmer, the court relied on the principle 
that “no man should profit from his own wrong” to help reach its decision 
in a homicide case.  Despite Chen’s clear decision that Xu should be put to 
death, his legal opinion as recorded in The Collected Works of Chen Ziang 
also acknowledged certain contradictions and competing sources of 
authority – namely, the authority of the rites, as contained in the Confucian 
classics.  Indeed, Chen quoted to the Confucian classics, notably the famous 
passage justifying revenge killings in the Book of Rites: “one should not live 
under the same Heaven with the enemy who has slain one’s father.”65  Chen 
admitted that such a principle was important for moral instruction, and that 
based on this principle, it appeared that Xu should be pardoned.66  
Therefore, Chen continued his legal opinion, offering more justification and 
explanation for why executing Xu was the proper decision: 
 
I have heard that punishments were created in order to contain 
and control chaos and disorder.  Furthermore, the purpose of 
benevolence (ren) is to exalt and promote moral integrity and moral 
conduct.  Xu Yuanqing’s act of vengeance for his father was not an 
act of [or motivated by] chaos or disorder.  His adherence to the 
proper Way of the father-son relationship is an expression of 
benevolence (ren).  Practicing benevolence (ren) yet not receiving 
any benefits, while receiving a punishment akin to having 
committed acts of chaos or disorder as well as suffering capital 
punishment – such an approach emphasizes adeptness at punishing, 
and it cannot be made a law of the state.  On the other hand, evil 
arises in opposition to uprightness.  Creating a stable and tranquil 
government also requires overcoming and ending periods of 
significant chaos or disorder.  Therefore, there are times when ritual 
propriety cannot deal with all eventualities.  The ancient sage kings 
 
 
65 Dalby, supra note 49, at 271. 
66 Id.   
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recognized this limitation, and that is why they created 
punishments.67 
 
In this passage, Chen admitted that Xu’s act of killing Zhao Shiyun was 
not driven by a desire to cause chaos or disorder, which Tang criminal law 
was aimed at controlling and containing.  He also admitted that morally 
speaking, and according to the standards of ritual propriety, Xu’s acts were 
admirable and were manifestations of benevolence (ren), one of the highest 
Confucian virtues.  Indeed, as Chen pointed out, Xu committed a benevolent 
act and did not receive any benefit, recognition, or reward for it.  Rather, Xu 
was going to be punished and receive the ultimate penalty – capital 
punishment –for his actions.  However, in this passage, we do not see Chen 
pushing for Xu’s release based on the standards of ritual propriety which 
extol the morally worthy nature of his actions.  Rather, Chen also continued 
the dichotomy between written laws and punishments on one hand, and 
ritual propriety and the rites on the other hand, the same dichotomy he 
presented at the very start of the legal opinion.  Chen continued his legal 
opinion, again opting for the supremacy of legal standards and principles 
regarding homicide as the guiding standard in the Xu case: 
 
In the present case, if we solely admire Xu Yuanqing’s 
motivations of integrity and righteousness [and pardon him], this 
would be invalidating the laws of the state.  However, we must 
remember that the reason why Xu Yuanqing’s righteous actions 
could move all-under-Heaven is that he did not fear death in his 
pursuit of virtue and righteousness.  If we pardon him in order to 
keep him alive, we are actually robbing him of his virtue and 
diluting his filial righteousness.  This would not be in alignment 
with the moral principles of sacrificing one’s life without fear of 
death to make benevolence more manifest.  I believe we should act 
in accordance with the law and put Xu Yuanqing to death.  We 
should also erect a memorial pennant at his tomb and at his home 
[to honor the morality of his actions].68 
 
Above, Chen made clear that the laws of the state should be the 
prevailing standard.  He also attempted to argue that his decision would 
actually benefit Xu and moral education in the long-run, as putting Xu to 
death would enshrine Xu’s status as a martyr.   The version of the legal 
 
 
67 OUYANG & SONG, supra note 63, at 195.5586. 
68 Id. at 195.5586. 
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opinion contained in The Collected Writings of Chen Ziang also contains 
other arguments offered by Chen in support of his decision.  He also 
considered other potential consequences of pardoning Xu.  First, Chen 
argued that pardoning Xu would create a bad precedent for future cases 
which would make governance more difficult and lead to more disorder and 
killing.69  Specifically, Chen argued that people will have sons, and sons 
will definitely have feelings of love for their parents.70  Therefore, a 
precedent of pardoning Xu could potentially lead to a succession of revenge 
killings, which would be anathema to societal order.71  Second, Chen 
pointed out that to rule in Xu’s favor would be equivalent to placing overly 
optimistic faith in people’s inborn righteousness, which is an inadequate 
foundation for government.72  Furthermore, ruling for Xu would be 
tantamount to furthering private righteousness at the expense of the public 
law.73  Thus, we can see Chen’s reliance on other “policies” to decide the 
case, including a concern for precedent, social order, and keeping the public 
law strong and intact. 
 Now that we have examined the sections of Chen’s legal opinion, we 
can take a step back and holistically analyze Chen’s legal opinion and 
compare it to Dworkin’s theories on adjudication.  Chen’s approach is 
indeed similar to Dworkin’s interpretive approach to law in dealing with 
hard cases.  First, Chen relied on principles and policies in rendering his 
decision, including the principle that murderers should themselves be put to 
death, as well as policies favoring public safety, order, and effective 
government.  This shows that law was understood as more than simply rules 
and posited law and statutes in traditional China.  Second, Chen did not 
simply choose principles or policies at whim, but wrestled with the question 
of how his decision would best cohere with the institutional history of the 
law and which would fit past official actions.  He tried to seek consistency 
and integrity in answering the legal question of whether to Xu should be 
found culpable.  Specifically, Chen considered the history of the Sage Kings 
and their visions of government, attempting to show that his decision to 
execute Xu was in alignment and in coherence with the Sage Kings’ 
emphasis on social order and the importance they placed on laws and 
punishments.  In other words, Chen attempted to show that his decision was 
not a novel one, but one which simply respected and applied the standards 
 
 
69 Dalby, supra note 49, at 280-81.  See also Chen, Fu chou yi zhuang, supra note 63, at 7.153. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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set forth by the Sage Kings.  Indeed, the very act of using and referring to 
the Sage Kings as a standard can be understood by Chen’s effort to operate 
within, in Dworkinian terms, the institutional history of his community74 – 
after all, since the time of Confucius, the Sage Kings were universally 
acknowledged as the cultural and political heroes and models of the Chinese 
polity worthy of emulation.   
Third, Chen also considered whether his decision would make the law 
the best it could be – indeed, one of Chen’s central arguments in defense of 
his decision was that pardoning Xu would directly “invalidate” and weaken 
the laws of the state.  At the same time, Chen was not simply applying the 
principle that murderers should themselves be put to death.  He was not, in 
other words, a pure formalist.  In his decision, Chen sought not only to make 
it a best “fit” with past official actions (i.e., the actions and philosophies of 
the Sage Kings), but also sought to combine “fit” and moral value to make 
the law even stronger – he did this by arguing that putting Xu to death 
actually enhanced and strengthened the moral value and power of Xu’s 
benevolent act, as well as recommending that a memorial be constructed for 
Xu.  This, in Chen’s view, would have the effect of also humanizing the law 
and his theory of law by transforming it also into a moral tool of instruction, 
which would also serve the policy goal of ensuring order.  His decision 
would therefore justify the entire legal system even further not as one which 
simply made sure that murderers would be punished, but as one which also 
ensured that the moral quality and value of certain criminal acts could be 
preserved.  Thus, on the whole, Chen sought to ensure coherence between 
his interpretation of law and the moral and ritual conventions of his 
community – to fail to do so would likely have weakened Tang criminal law 
(e.g., Tang citizens might have been outraged at the coldness of Chen’s legal 
opinion if he had only blindly applied the principle that murderers must 
themselves be put to death without considerations of combining “fit” and 
moral value).  In sum, we can see elements of Dworkin’s interpretive theory 
of law in the context of hard cases in Chen’s legal opinion. 
 A hard case requires disagreements about legal propositions so we now 
turn to the diverging legal opinion in the Xu Yuanqing case, authored by 
Liu Zongyuan approximately a century after Chen’s legal opinion.  The fact 
that the Xu case was still being discussed in the highest echelons of the Tang 
court indicates the importance, significance, and controversies associated 
 
 
74 The Dworkinian concept of “institutional history” can be understood as “resid[ing] in the 
common law, statutory law and in the construction of the state in question, including communal morality.  
Such institutional history is the source of the system of norms.”  KOOS MALAN, POLITOCRACY: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE COERCIVE LOGIC OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE AND IDEAS AROUND A RESPONSE 
TO IT 169 (Johan Scott trans., Pretoria Univ. L. Press 2012) (2011). 
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with the Xu case.  Liu began his legal opinion attacking Chen’s 
understanding of ritual, as well as Chen’s attempted compromise solution 
of executing Xu while honoring him posthumously: 
 
The roots of ritual are to prevent and stop chaos and disorder.  
For example, the ritual codes say that one shall not commit acts 
which harm or mistreat his parents.  Any sons who do such things 
must be executed and not pardoned.  The roots of punishments are 
also to prevent and stop chaos and disorder.  For example, criminal 
law mandates that one shall not commit acts which harm or abuse 
the people.  Any official who does such things shall be put to death 
and not pardoned.  The root of ritual and punishments are the same, 
but their use and application are different.  You cannot 
simultaneously erect a memorial pennant to honor someone and 
also have him executed.  It is excessive and undue to execute 
someone who should be honored [via a memorial pennant].  Such 
an act is to misuse punishments.  Likewise, to honor someone [via 
a memorial pennant] is also a serious mistake.  Such an act destroys 
and makes a mockery of the rites.75 
 
Above, Liu disagreed with the dichotomy created between the rites one 
on hand, and laws and punishments on the other as was seen in Chen’s 
opinion.  Instead, Liu argued that the purposes of ritual on the one hand, and 
written law (e.g., statutes) & punishments on the other, was indeed the same 
– both sought to prevent and stop chaos and disorder.  He also immediately 
attacked Chen’s attempted compromise as self-contradictory and harmful 
toward rites and punishments as tools of government.  At the same time, Liu 
seemed to have advanced a guiding, overarching, absolutist “principle” in 
the Dworkinian sense – that is, that any official which harms or abuses the 
people shall be put to death (interestingly, he does not cite to Tang Code 
provisions on official misconduct or corruption).76  Liu then continued his 
 
 
75 OUYANG & SONG, supra note 63, at 195.5586.  Another longer version of Liu’s legal opinion 
can also be found in Liu Zongyuan, Bo fu chou yi [Refuting the Revenge Debate], in LIU HEDONG JI 
[THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LIU ZONGYUAN] 4.63-65 (Shanghai People’s Press ed., 1974).  My 
translation is based on the version in OUYANG & SONG, supra note 63, at 195.5586-5587, although I will 
include important additional material from the version in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LIU ZONGYUAN.  
Dalby discusses Liu’s opinion, although he does not provide a full translation, in Dalby, supra note 49, 
at 282-85.  I am indebted to Dalby’s discussion, which helped in my understanding and translation of 
Liu Zongyuan’s legal opinion.  However, my interpretation of Liu Zongyuan’s legal opinion differs in 
some areas from Dalby’s.   
76 For example, Article 148 in the Tang Code provided that officials who took advantage of their 
power could be punished up to a maximum of three years’ imprisonment.  See THE TANG CODE, 
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legal opinion with a discussion of two possible competing factual 
circumstances of the case: 
 
Take, for example, if Xu Yuanqing’s father was innocent and 
Zhao Shiyun had him killed out of personal hatred and abuse of 
official authority, or if his superiors had not been informed of the 
case, or if Xu Yuanqing’s cry for justice had been ignored – then, 
Xu Yuanqing’s deliberate and planned act of vengeance and his 
self-reliance for carrying out such revenge, without any fear of 
death or regrets, is in accordance with ritual and an act of 
righteousness.  If this was indeed the situation and the 
circumstances surrounding the case, then the officials should feel 
ashamed. They would not delay in the slightest to vacate Xu 
Yuanqing’s conviction – indeed how could they have him 
executed?  Now, it is entirely possible that Xu Yuanqing’s father 
was guilty of something, and so when Zhao Shiyun had him 
executed, he was not acting against the law of the state.  Therefore, 
under this situation, we cannot say that Xu Yuanqing’s father died 
at the hands of an individual official, but rather, he died under, and 
in accordance with, the law.  Indeed, how could we possibly hold a 
grudge against the law?  To hold a grudge against the law of the 
emperor or to execute or harm a law-abiding official is an act of 
presumptuous arrogance and defiance against the emperor.  Under 
this set of facts, arresting and executing Xu Yuanqing are both acts 
in alignment with, and which uphold, the laws of the state.  
Therefore, why should we honor Xu Yuanqing’s actions in these 
circumstances?77 
 
Above, Liu emphasized the importance of understanding the facts 
surrounding Xu’s father death.  Based on the principle he advanced earlier 
of the necessity of putting abusive and harmful officials to death, Liu argued 
that Xu Yuanqing’s revenge killing would be justified if Zhao Shiyun had 
unjustly killed Xu’s father.  It would also be justified if Zhao’s killing of 
Xu’s father had not been properly reported to higher-level authorities, or if 
Xu’s cries for justice had been ignored, presumably by other officials – in 
other words, Xu’s act of revenge would be justified if there was misconduct 
on the part of officials.  However, if Xu’s father was indeed guilty and justly 
 
 
VOLUME II: SPECIFIC ARTICLES 118-19 (Wallace Johnson trans., Princeton University Press 1997) 
(653). 
77 OUYANG & SONG, supra note 63, at 195.5586-5587. 
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executed, Xu would not be justified in taking revenge, for doing so would 
be an affront to the laws of the state.  Thus, similar to Chen, Liu also was 
concerned with “making the law the best it could be” in preserving and 
upholding the laws of the state.  Liu then continued his legal opinion, 
critiquing specific arguments previously advanced by Chen.  He first took 
issue with Chen’s policy argument that chaos and disorder would result 
from pardoning Xu, because that would encourage a likely succession of 
revenge killings – recall that Chen’s logic (as discussed earlier) was that 
people would definitely have sons, sons would definitely have feelings of 
love for their parents, and therefore if every son took revenge, chaos and 
disorder would result.78  Liu argued that Chen again misunderstood the 
meaning and significance of ritual propriety and the entire concept of 
revenge: 
 
The enmity (chou) referred to in the codes of ritual is a type of 
enmity which arises because someone has suffered a significant 
injustice or oppression and who has nowhere to turn.  It is not a type 
of enmity which arises simply because a person who has broken the 
law is punished and executed – to say that because the avenger 
killed someone and therefore the avenger himself must be killed – 
this kind of attitude is not based on an understanding of the 
distinctions between uprightness and injustice.  It is nothing more 
than threatening and bullying the weak.79 
 
As Michael Dalby has also explained, Liu argued here that Chen’s 
articulated fear of a descent into social chaos and Chen’s belief that revenge 
killings should hence be banned (recall one of the guiding principles in 
Chen’s decision – one who kills another shall be put to death) were 
misplaced.80  In Liu’s view, Chen was wrong because the revenge 
referenced in the ritual codes (i.e., as set forth in the Confucian classics) 
described situations where feelings of injustice were not properly answered 
because they were not heard; simply executing an avenger under the 
principle of “one who kills another shall be put to death” without delving 
into the facts and circumstances around the case would be simply 
“threatening and bullying the weak.”81 Liu then proceeded to examine 
standards as set forth in the classical texts, again akin to the Dworkinian 
 
 
78 LIU, supra note 75, at 4.65. 
79 OUYANG & SONG, supra note 63, at 195.5587. 
80 Dalby, supra note 49, at 284. 
81 Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
22 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:1 
 
 
 
belief that law consists of more than simply rules.  Liu used these standards 
as further evidence that Chen’s fear of unending social disorder resulting 
from pardoning Xu and allowing revenge killings was misplaced: 
 
The Gongyang commentary says: “if a father who should not 
have been killed has been killed, then his son can take revenge.  If 
a father should have been killed and was indeed killed, and if the 
son still proceeds to take revenge, this will cause an endless spiral 
and vicious cycle of revenge killings.”  Using this principle to 
decide the Xu Yuanqing case would be in accordance with the 
requirements of ritual.82  [In the version of the legal opinion 
contained in The Collected Works of Liu Zongyuan, Liu also quoted 
to the Rites of Zhou material on the conciliator figure, whose job 
was to help resolve enmity in people and to put avengers to death 
who take revenge for fathers killed justly.  Liu then argued that in 
antiquity it was therefore considered highly unlikely that social 
chaos would erupt from revenge killings due to this conciliator 
figure.83]   Furthermore, not forgetting the enemy of your father 
constitutes filial piety.  Not fearing death constitutes righteousness.  
Xu Yuanqing was able not to exceed the boundaries of ritual 
propriety, act in a filial manner, and he ultimately died for the sake 
of righteousness.  He must have been a rational person who 
understood the way of righteousness.  How could the law of the 
state treat such a person as an enemy?  Yet some [like Chen Ziang] 
have memorialized the throne, arguing that Xu Yuanqing should be 
executed.  Such decisions abusing the use of criminal sanctions and 
destroying the codes of ritual propriety must not be taken as 
precedents.84  If there are future similar cases, we must not follow 
the precedent of Chen Ziang’s decision.85 
 
Liu concluded above by arguing that Xu was indeed acting righteously 
in the revenge killing, and he also urged the Tang leadership to void and 
 
 
82 In the version of the legal opinion contained in The Collected Works of Liu Zongyuan, Liu also 
quoted to the Rites of Zhou material on the conciliator figure, whose job was to help resolve enmity in 
people and to put avengers to death who take revenge for fathers killed justly.  Liu then argued that in 
antiquity it was therefore considered highly unlikely that social chaos would erupt from revenge killings 
due to this conciliator figure.  
83 Liu, supra note 75, at 4.65. 
84 It is unclear whether Chen’s opinion became a part of the Regulations (ge) of the Tang dynasty, 
which was the proper way to incorporate new legislation into Tang dynasty law. Dalby, supra note 49, 
at 282 n. 30. 
85 OUYANG & SONG, supra note 63, at 195.5587. 
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ignore Chen’s legal opinion as precedent.  If we step back and holistically 
analyze Liu’s legal opinion, we can see that his approach can also be 
analogized to Dworkin’s interpretive approach to law in dealing with hard 
cases.  First, he of course reached a different result than Chen.  But, like 
Chen, Liu relied on principles and policies in rendering his decision, also 
showing that law was understood as more than simply rules in traditional 
China, although he disagreed with certain propositions of law advanced by 
Chen, a defining characteristic of a “hard case.”  For example, Liu believed 
that Chen’s principle that murders should themselves be put to death was 
too rigid and did not take into account the facts and circumstances of 
revenge killings.  Furthermore, in Liu’s view, Chen’s policy concerns were 
misguided (i.e., the policy concerns of social chaos and disorder due to 
pardoning Xu and condoning revenge killings) because they were based on 
a mistaken and ahistorical understanding of the rites.  With respect to 
principles, Liu’s adjudication seems to have been driven by the principles 
that the facts and circumstances of revenge killing cases must be examined 
closely for evidence of official misconduct.  If there is evidence of official 
misconduct, then it would be justified for the son to take revenge against the 
official, since another guiding principle is that officials who harm and abuse 
others should be put to death.  Liu also considered certain “policies”, 
including the harm that Chen’s contradictory compromise of execution and 
posthumous honoring would have on society and government through 
mutual destruction of both rites and laws & punishments, as well as his 
concerns over the abuse of criminal penalties by Chen’s legal opinion.   
Second, as with Chen, Liu did not simply choose principles or policies 
at whim, but similarly wrestled with the question of how his decision would 
best cohere with the institutional history of the law and which would fit past 
official actions.  Whereas Chen largely appealed specifically to the Sage 
Kings and what he considered to be their visions of government, Liu instead 
looked more closely at Chinese classical texts, such as the Gongyang 
commentary and the Rites of Zhou, arguing that these texts disproved 
Chen’s concerns over social disorder and therefore that Chen’s decision was 
not in alignment and coherence with the standards and visions contained 
within these texts, which were representations of the institutional history of 
the community – after all, we must remember that these texts had important, 
almost canonical status in the Tang as containing important principles, 
lessons, and models for governance and human behavior.   
Third, as with Chen, Liu also considered whether his decision would 
make the law the best it could be.  Rather than what he considered to be 
Chen’s unyielding, absolutist formalism, Liu believed his more nuanced 
approach would arguably strengthen the law by taking into account the 
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precise facts and circumstances surrounding the particular revenge killing 
(e.g., whether the father’s death was justified under the law) – otherwise, as 
Liu mentioned, the law might be viewed as simply “threatening and bullying 
the weak.”  And, like Chen, his adjudicatory methods show him to be 
considered about combining “fit” and moral value to make the law even 
stronger – Liu believed his legal opinion “fit” ritual and legal expectations, 
as well as the standards advanced by the Chinese textual tradition.  At the 
same time, it of course preserved the morality and righteousness of Chen’s 
actions, which collectively had the effect of enhancing ritual and 
punishment as tools in government (which, as Liu had argued, share the 
same roots of preventing chaos and disorder).   
In sum, I believe that Chen and Liu’s legal opinions on the Xu 
Yuanqing hard case– representative of traditional Chinese jurisprudence 
generally— reveal an adjudicatory technique akin to Dworkin’s interpretive 
theory of law.  Of course, it should be pointed out that there are some 
differences between Chen’s and Liu’s approach and Dworkin’s interpretive 
theory.  Recall that Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law is grounded largely 
in liberalism and a vocabulary of individual rights.  Clearly, Chen’s and 
Liu’s legal opinions did not contain vocabulary or language grounded in 
Dworkin’s notions of liberalism or rights.  However, I do not believe this 
difference should obscure the similarities between the overall adjudicative 
approaches of Confucian jurisprudence and Dworkin; indeed, although they 
do not use language couched in Western liberalism, Chen and Liu did have 
concerns for Xu’s “rights” (e.g., even Chen, who called for Xu’s execution, 
wanted Xu properly honored after his death). 
III. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS ON THE FIELD OF LEGAL THEORY 
GENERALLY 
Having now attempted to show that traditional Chinese jurisprudence 
as viewed through the adjudication of an actual Tang dynasty hard case 
shares much in common with Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law, this 
paper concludes by discussing the broader implications of these findings on 
the field of legal theory, and comparative jurisprudence, more generally.   
 First, through the above comparison between Confucian jurisprudence 
and Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law and the argument that Confucian 
jurisprudence shares much in common with Dworkin’s interpretive theory 
of law, it can be argued that Dworkin’s theories of adjudication and the 
application of his views on law need not be confined to Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  This is a significant jurisprudential point because Dworkin 
himself has espoused particularist tendencies, and he has also been 
criticized as a particularist.  For example, in the Postscript to the second 
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edition of his The Concept of Law, Hart argued that he was attempting to 
put forth a theory of general jurisprudence, while Dworkin’s jurisprudence 
was addressed to a particular legal culture.86  Others have criticized 
Dworkin of being a cultural relativist.87  Dworkin, similarly, was 
circumspect regarding the application of his interpretive theory of law 
outside the Anglo-American tradition, arguing that “interpretive theories are 
by their nature addressed to a particular legal culture, generally the culture 
to which their authors belong.”88  However, as Twining has pointed out, 
Dworkin may have been too modest about the geographical reach of his 
more general ideas, arguing that Dworkin’s Hercules could be a “citizen at 
least of the West and possibly of the world” and a role model for the 
European Union or even Islamic courts.89  Twining also argues there is “no 
reason in principle why possible application of Dworkin’s most general 
ideas should not be tested . . . in respect of non-Western cultures and 
discourses.”90  This article has sought to do such testing, and through the 
earlier analysis of adjudication of the Xu Yuanqing hard case in the Chinese 
legal tradition, we can see that Dworkin’s interpretive theory does arguably 
“travel better” than Dworkin himself as well as other critics have believed.   
Second, by showing that Confucian jurisprudence is akin to Dworkin’s 
interpretive theory of law, this article also hopes to correct one of Dworkin’s 
misunderstandings and show that traditional Chinese law and jurisprudence 
specifically are not incompatible with the Dworkinian approach.  This is an 
important point because Dworkin himself did not have a very good 
impression of the modern Chinese legal system or of traditional Chinese 
law.  Indeed, as some have argued, Dworkin likely believed the U.S. and 
British legal systems were by far the best, if not the only real, legal 
systems.91  For example, in May 2002, Dworkin was invited to China for 
two weeks to deliver multiple lectures in different Chinese universities; the 
lecture topics included human rights, democracy, and legality.92  In an 
 
 
86 H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 239-240 (2d ed., 1994); see also TWINING, supra note 12, at 
12. 
87 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE 
INFLUENCE OF HLA HART 26-28 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987); P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMNERS, FORM AND 
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 420 (1987).  I am grateful to William Twining for this point 
and for introducing these sources. See TWINING, supra note 12, at 42.   
88 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 102-103.   
89 TWINING, supra note 12, at 44, 65. 
90 Id. at 65. 
91 See, e.g., Jean-Marc Coicaud, A Research Agenda: Global-National Law: The Case of Taiwan 
and the Comparative Analysis, Lecture at the Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 
Taiwan, July 14, 2015) (transcript available in the Institutum Iurisprudentiae). 
92 See also DANIEL A. BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL THINKING FOR AN EAST 
ASIAN CONTEXT 1-4 (2006) (summarizing and discussing Dworkin’s 2002 visit to China). 
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article published in The New York Review of Books following his visit, 
Dworkin blasted the modern Chinese legal system, writing that “China’s 
record of ignoring the rule of law, suppressing democracy, and 
systematically violating human rights is notorious.”93  He also attacked the 
Chinese legal tradition and Confucianism, claiming that traditional legal 
practice in China rejected two principles central to the rule of law – 
“coercive power of the state may only be exercised in accordance with 
standards established in advance, and that judges must be independent of 
the executive and legislative powers of government.”94  Instead, Dworkin 
argued, traditional Chinese legal practice followed the Confucian view: 
“That law is a matter not of rules or general principles, but of virtue, equity, 
and reasonableness in individual cases” and that “[j]udges developed no 
system of legal precedent: there was no understanding, that is, that judges 
in later cases would follow principles laid down in earlier decisions.”95  
However, as we can see in Liu and Chen’s legal opinions in the Xu case, 
Dworkin’s views on Confucian jurisprudence were not accurate. Liu and 
Chen were concerned about law, legal rules, and general principles, as well 
as precedent. Indeed,  one of Liu’s central concerns was that Chen’s legal 
opinion was being taken as a precedent by officials judging revenge cases – 
he would not have had such concerns if Chinese officials did not seek to 
follow principles laid down in earlier decisions. 
Finally, while the focus of this article has been on how Confucian 
jurisprudence can be analogized to Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law, we 
might now step back and ask a more macroscopic question:  what is more 
unique about Confucian jurisprudence, and how might it contribute to 
dialogue on comparative jurisprudence more generally?  First, Confucian 
jurisprudence, as seen through the legal opinions on the Xu Yuanqing case, 
can be understood as a jurisprudence which draws on an even more 
numerous and diverse base of resources for adjudication and solving legal 
problems than in Dworkin’s vision of law.  In other words, one of Dworkin’s 
major contributions to legal theory was precisely that his vision of law was 
much broader than that of the positivists – he believed law was made up of 
much more than simply rules, but also principles.  Confucian jurisprudence 
goes beyond Dworkin’s vision of law and sees law and sources of law as 
being comprised of not only principles but also of history, historical actors, 
and classical canonical texts.  Chen’s legal opinion was not just based on 
the principle that murderers should themselves also be executed, but also 
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considered the visions and concerns of the ancient Chinese Sage Kings 
History and historical models conveyed, and themselves became, legal 
standards.  Indeed, this is different from Dworkin’s approach and attitude 
toward the historical. For example, he was not a strong supporter of using 
historical approaches to interpreting the U.S. constitution, and as Keith E. 
Whittington has argued, described his legal theory project in largely 
“ahistorical terms.”96  On the contrary, history played an important role in 
Liu’s and Chen’s legal opinions and rose to become legal standards.  Liu, 
for example, made reference to classical canonical texts, such as the 
Gongyang commentary, in his legal opinion.  In other words, Confucian 
jurisprudence is arguably even more interpretive than Dworkin’s 
interpretive theory of law, and it assumes a far more integrated world of 
law, where law interacts with, and is enriched by, history, political theory, 
and morality.  History, historical actors, and historical texts do not merely 
provide rhetorical power to legal opinions, as they often do in Anglo-
American judicial opinions.  In Confucian jurisprudence, they can also serve 
as sources of law and legal standards.  This integrated view of law is not 
surprising, given that an independent judiciary never emerged in traditional 
China.   
Dworkin criticized the Confucian view of law as eschewing the idea 
of law as rules or general principles and instead relying on virtue, equity, 
and reasonableness.  Dworkin was incorrect. The strength and uniqueness 
of Confucian jurisprudence is its ability to simultaneously view the idea of 
law as rules and general principles, while bringing to bear virtue, equity, 
and reasonableness-based considerations. Indeed, practitioners of 
Confucian jurisprudence (like Chen and Liu) would argue that it is precisely 
this integrated view of law which actually makes law the best it can be, 
because rather than law being relegated to the intellectual and institutional 
confines of an independent judiciary, law is empowered when it is applied 
in a case with due concerns toward the decision’s effects on the 
community’s history, sense of morality, policy concerns, and future.  
Practitioners of Confucian jurisprudence might even say that their 
integrated theoretical understanding of law is really not that much different 
to Dworkin’s own integrated understanding of jurisprudence as a branch of 
moral and political philosophy.97 
 
 
96 Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s ‘Originalism’: The Role of Intentions in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 62.2 REV. POLITICS 197, 199 (2000).  Indeed, as quoted in Whittington’s article (on page 
199), Dworkin remarked that: “[w]e’re not concerned with the historical question here.  We’re not 
concerned about how principles are in fact chosen.  We’re concerned about which principles are just.” 
97 PENNER & MELISSARIS, supra note 25, at 84. 
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